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There is the old idea, which has withstood the 
passage of time, that dominant social forces in 
society maintain their domination not through the 
use of force but through having their worldview 
accepted as natural by those over whom 
domination is exercised.1 
 
A. Introduction 
 
Historically, the use of international arbitration to resolve foreign investment disputes was 
advocated to prevent discrimination against foreign investors and avoid violation of their 
due process rights by so-called abusive governments with weak judiciaries. For this reason, 
the use of international investment arbitration (IIA), which arguably has the strongest rights 
enforcement mechanism existing in international law,2 has been perceived as facilitating 
access to justice for foreign investors at the international level. Despite IIA's popularity with 
investors, this system of dispute settlement has been criticised by state actors, legal 
scholars, and civil society activists alike. In response, the European Union (EU) has proposed  
establishing a permanent investment court system (ICS) which would settle investment 
disputes between EU member states and foreign investors.3 According to the EU, the ICS will 
remedy many of the observed flaws in the IIA model.  
                                                      
1 B S Chimni ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A manifesto’ 8 International Community Law 
Review (2006) 3, 15. 
2 B A Simmons, ‘Bargaining over BITS, Arbitrating Awards: The Regime for Protection and Promotion of 
International Investment’, 66 World Politics (2014) 12, 17. 
3 Together with Canada, the EU is also promoting a multilateral version of the ICS: 'European Commission and 
Canadian Government co-host discussions on a multilateral investment court, Brussels 13 December 2016', 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4349_en.htm  (last visited 10 February 2018). China is 
also reported to have plans to establish a court system to settle trade and investment disputes with foreign 
investors: 'China’s plans for creating new international courts are raising fears of bias CNBC, Nyshka Chandran 
1 February 2018', https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/01/china-to-create-international-courts-for-belt-and-road-
disputes.html (last visited 4 February 2018). 
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While some of its shortcomings may be resolved, this essay questions the appropriateness 
of promoting special routes for access to justice (understood in a broad sense to encompass 
its various possible forms) for a class of privileged investors. It highlights the potentially 
detrimental effects of such a promotion on local justice mechanisms that serve the whole of 
society. It argues that judicialising investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the direction 
envisaged by the EU's ICS is the wrong approach because it prioritises institutions of justice 
for foreign investors over the improvement of local institutions that could provide justice for 
members across society, including foreign investors. Throughout this essay, the prioritisation 
of remediating foreign investor grievances via ISDS is referred to as a ‘justice bubble’.    
 
Two caveats are in order. First, the creation of the ICS and improvements to local 
institutions of justice are not necessarily competing agendas amounting to a zero sum 
game. States could properly resource both the improvement of local institutions and special 
modes of dispute settlement for foreign investors. That said, if local institutions of justice 
are strong, the question arises as to why states would need to promote special modes of 
dispute settlement serving only foreign investors. After all, substantial resources are needed 
to set up and maintain an investment court system. Where states prioritise allocating 
resources into the creation and maintenance of justice bubbles for the privileged, they are 
inevitably taking away valuable resources and attention which could have been used, had 
the political will existed, to improve the effectiveness of local judicial and non-judicial 
protection mechanisms that serve all members of society. 
 
The second caveat is to make it clear that the objection raised in this essay is not to the ad 
hoc use of international arbitration in settling investor-state disputes—rather it is to the 
efforts to validate the idea that IIA should be the default and most appropriate mode of 
resolving investor-state disputes. While the critique presented here is relevant beyond the 
EU’s agreements, the latter deserve particular attention since their adoption would in all 
likelihood entrench ever greater prioritisation—on a global scale—of the commercial 
interests of the wealthiest few over wider societal interests by, inter alia, making justice 
bubbles for investors more permanent. Introducting a standing court system is likely to lock 
a relatively large number of states into this mode of dispute settlement for decades, and 
potentially define the new ISDS system as a template of good governance.  
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In 2017 the Court of Justice of the Europan Union (CJEU) issued an opinion clarifying that 
the EU and its members states share competence on the question of ISDS and that  member 
state approval is therefore required for the adoption of the ICS.4  The fact that the EU and its 
member states are currently at a critical junction in terms of the path to choose for ISDS in 
the EU’s new investment treaty program makes this essay particularly timely. I begin by 
critically analysing the imposition of IIA as the most appropriate method for resolving 
investor-state disputes. A brief overview of the recent and increasing backlash against IIA 
follows. The responses this attracted in the form of a ICS proposal by the EU are then 
examined. The final section argues that the establishment of a permanent investment court 
is a short-sighted solution to shortcomings in local access to justice which is likely to 
undermine domestic legal developments. What is needed is a rejection of the outsourcing of 
the settlement of investment disputes on a permanent basis. If this were achieved, it would 
constitute a paradigmatic shift in approaches to access to justice. 
 
B. The imposition of IIA as the most appropriate ISDS method 
 
Investor-state disputes can be resolved in various fora. As a generic phrase, ISDS can 
encompass judicial proceedings, conciliation, mediation, negotiation and arbitration.5 IIA 
has long been the most popular method to resolve foreign investment disputes for well-
resourced investors. Investors able to mount claims against host states through the IIA 
mechanism are typically wealthy, given the huge associated costs. Small businesses are less 
likely to have the necessary funds to be able to resort to this mechanism. An OECD survey 
showed that ‘costs for the parties in recent ISDS cases have averaged over USD 8 million 
with costs exceeding USD 30 million in some cases.’ 6 In this essay, references to ‘privileged 
investors' are to those investors who can afford this very special mode of dispute resolution.  
 
                                                      
4 Opinion 2/15 of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 16 May 2017.  
5 Investment disputes may also be brought before the courts of the regional human rights systems; see 
Velikovi v Bulgaria ECHR App No 43278/98, 48 EHRR 27 (2007). 
6 OECD, ‘Investor-state dispute settlement public consultation: 16 May–9 July 2012’ available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291642.pdf  (last visited 10 February 
2018). 
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The procedural empowerment of investors via IIA has been described as the ‘most effective 
means of resolving investor-state disputes’7—a ‘real innovation’8 in international 
investment law (IIL). Most investment treaties neither require exhaustion of local remedies 
nor do they provide extensive grounds for reviewing IIA awards. Moreover, they institute a 
monopoly over the interpretation of the bilateral investment treaty (‘BIT’) provisions, which 
are typically ‘relatively brief and [written] at a fairly high level of generality’.9  Because of 
this, IIA rulings cannot but impact the practice of states regarding their IIL obligations10 as 
well as having an influence on states’ non-investment obligations, such as those under 
international human rights law or environmental law.11 
 
An investment treaty is not the only place where arbitration is used. International and local 
commercial disputes, as well as inter-state disputes, are also frequently resolved through 
arbitration. This can be a legitimate method for resolving disputes, founded on the 
principles of consent and party autonomy.12  In most cases, private parties mutually agree, 
in a contract, to submit their disputes to arbitration rather than resorting to national courts. 
They do so for a variety of reasons, for example concerns for confidentiality or trust in the 
arbitrators' expertise. In these instances, the decision to submit to arbitration is made ad 
hoc; the parties do not submit all future disputes between themselves to arbitration, but 
only those that relate to the specific legal relationship referred to in the arbitration 
agreement. With the reach and impact of the agreement strictly limited to the contract and 
its signatories, arbitration normally does not constitute a large-scale transfer of judicial 
authority.  
 
In contrast, investment treaty arbitration’s personal and material reach is so wide that it 
entails such a transfer. The source of most contemporary investment arbitration, 
                                                      
7 C Reiner and C Schreuer, ‘Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration’, in P M Dupuy, E U 
Petersmann and F Francioni (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford UP 
2009), 82. 
8 S Franck, ‘Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Rule of Law’ 19 McGeorge Global 
Business and Development Law Journal (2007) 337, 343. 
9 S Ratner, The Thin Justice of International Law (Oxford UP, 2015) 350 and 371. 
10 Ibid 371. 
11 C Titi, The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law (Nomos/Hart 2014). 
12 N Blackaby, C Partasides, A Redfern & M Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration 6th Ed. 
(Oxford UP 2015) 71. 
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investment treaties negotiated between states see a state making a standing offer to 
arbitrate to an indeterminate number of investors from the other state party. This offer can 
be accepted by any qualifying investor through the initiation of arbitral proceedings. The 
host state may not even be aware of the existence of a dispute until it receives the notice of 
arbitration. The privileged investor which resorts to this mechanism does not need to have 
negotiated an arbitration agreement for a defined legal relationship. Instead, it can just 
claim the ‘right to arbitrate’ which its state has negotiated for its benefit and that of other 
qualifying investors. This has now become the normal way of settling disputes between 
international investors and host states. The EU’s proposals would render permanent the 
large-scale transfer of judicial authority this entails.  
 
Two arguments are often advanced to justify the use of IIA as the most appropriate method 
of ISDS. The first is that it improves access to justice for foreign investors,13 the second that 
it contributes to the development of the rule of law through the application of agreed 
minimal standards in host states14 as well as internationally.15 These two arguments are 
clearly related given that access to justice is a vital component of the rule of law. While the 
first justification is narrower in scope, the second one is a broader and bolder assumption.  
Neither stands. 
 
The use of arbitration to resolve foreign investment disputes was advocated in the 
postcolonial era to prevent discrimination against foreign investors and avoid denial of 
justice, leading to a diminution of investment value,16 by governments which it was feared 
would be abusive and/or would only have weak judiciaries.17 Distrust of the local judiciary as 
                                                      
13 F Francioni, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law’, 20 European Journal of 
International Law (2009) 729. 
14 S Franck (2007); B K Guthrie, ‘Beyond Investment Protection: An Examination of the Potential Influence of 
Investment Treaties on Domestic Rule of Law’ 45 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics (2013), 1151; J 
Paulsson, ‘Enclaves of Justice’ University of Miami Legal Studies Research Paper No.2010-29, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1707504  (last visited 10 February 2018). 
15 B Kingsbury and S Schill, ’Investor-State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, 
Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law’ (2009). New York University Public Law and Legal 
Theory Working Papers. 146 available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/146  (last visited 10 February 2018)  
16 D Schneiderman, ‘Investing in Democracy? Political Process and International Investment Law’ 60 University 
of Toronto Law Journal (2010) 909, 911. 
17 M-B Dembour and N Stammers, 'Free trade, protectionism, neolibearlism: Tensions and continuities', this 
volume; G Van Harten, ‘Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion’ 2(2) Trade Law and 
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corrupt or biased against foreign investors was perceived as a factor which could have 
deterred investors from entering the host state market. The solution found was to 
internationalise the resolution of foreign investment disputes. Amid worries that 
protectionist policies of host states would harm the liberalisation of global investment, it 
was argued that international rules and dispute settlement would help depoliticise 
disputes.18 With its declared aim of empowering foreign investors to access justice, IIA soon 
became presented as a necessity for any state wishing to attract foreign investment. The 
idea was quickly accepted that the substantive rights of investors anywhere in the world 
need to be backed up by procedural means capable of enforcing those rights. 
 
Mainstream thinking on IIA accepts that releasing foreign investors from the necessity of 
exhausting domestic remedies prior to initiating international arbitration is in place in order 
to prevent discrimination against, and give voice to, foreign investors who are 
unrepresented in the host state’s political process.19 This has the effect of prioritising  
international solutions which, in turn, reinforces the common perception that domestic 
institutions, actors, and cultures undermine democracy and human rights, whilst 
international law promotes them.20 The view of IIA as the impartial guardian of foreign 
investor’s rights epitomises the sanctity of the international and the distrust of the local. 
Interestingly, it also serves to underpin the argument that IIA stands to improve host states' 
poor records in terms of the rule of law. What the rule of law means is admittedly elusive.21 
However, in IIL debates, it tends to refer to democratic governance, limitation of 
                                                      
Development (2010) 19, 33; J Alvarez, The Public International Law Regime Governing International 
Investment, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) 113. 
18 N Tzouvala, ‘Ordo-liberal Origins of Modern International Investment Law: Constructing Competition on a 
Global Scale’ (Forthcoming in European Yearbook of International Economic Law) on file with the author.  
19 Hence the link made between access to justice and the 'minimum standard of treatment of aliens': see 
Francioni (2009), 731. See also Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States (Tecmed 
v Mexico), ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2 para 122.  
20 A Orford, ‘Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold War’, 38(2) Harvard 
International Law Journal (1997) 444, 484 (‘the international as a level of governance is the site of both 
emancipatory and oppressive values and projects, and that threats to democracy and human rights exist at the 
international level as well as the local level’.) See also See also M-B Dembour and T Kelly, 'Introduction: The 
Social Lives of International Justice', in M-B Dembour and T Kelly, Paths to International Justice: Social and 
Legal Perspectives (Oxford UP 2007) 1-28, 13. 
21 As Tamanaha has observed, the rule of law 'stands in the peculiar state of being the preeminent legitimating 
political ideal in the world today, without agreement upon precisely what it means’: B Z Tamanaha, On the 
Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge UP, 2004) 4. 
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government authority by law, legal certainty, protection of basic rights and, most 
importantly in the context of this essay, access to justice.  
 
An argument often made by proponents of investment liberalisation is that compelling host 
states to comply with international investment standards through recourse to an external 
enforcement mechanism has a positive effect on the local rule of law in the host state.22 It is 
argued that this happens in two ways. First decisions of IIA tribunals compels host states to 
comply with an external and a more just standard of treatment.23 Second, by leaving the 
final word to impartial and independent IIA tribunals, an increase in the levels of investment 
protection and legal certainty is achieved, in turn leading to economic and social 
development in the host state with positive effects on the rule of law in that state. Thus, for 
ardent proponents of the rule of law function such as Kingsbury and Schill, IIA is a tool 
capable of fostering ‘democratic accountability and participation …, good and orderly state 
administration and the protection of rights and other deserving interests’.24 In a similar vein, 
Franck presents investment treaty arbitration as a contributing factor to the development of 
the rule of law in host states with a weak rule of law. She argues that ‘investment treaty 
arbitration may create incentives for foreign investment by fostering the development of 
the rule of law’.25  
 
In fact, studies which have attempted to calculate the impact of IIL commitments on the 
volume of inward investment are inconclusive,26 as are those which have tried to examine 
the impact on the local rule of law. Although IIA commitments are sometimes 
acknowledged not to be a panacea for remedying a deficient rule of law,27 what needs to be 
                                                      
22 Franck (2007). 
23 Ibid 367.  
24 Kingsbury and Schill (2009), 8. 
25 Franck (2007), 340. 
26 L Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy: The Politics of Investment Treaties in Developing 
Countries (Cambridge UP, 2015) 7-8.  
27 R Dolzer, 'The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic Administrative Law' 37 International 
Law and Politics (2006), 952. 
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challenged is the very idea that procedural guarantees contained in IIL make a positive 
contribution to improving deficiencies in the domestic rule of law.28 
 
Tzouvala views IIL and its enforcement via IIA as a model of governance that is inherently 
anti-democratic. She argues that IIL should ‘be understood as a means for safeguarding 
hierarchy and power within each and every state … dictat[ing] acceptable models for state 
organisation and economic intervention and that is fundamentally inimical to mass politics 
and/or democratic determination of economic policies’.29 Schneiderman warns against the 
creation of legal enclaves for foreign investors on the grounds that this might deprive ‘the 
investor voice from the enterprise of creating good and generalised rule of law institutions 
in the host country’.30 A recent empirical study on the functions of IIA which explores the 
relationship of IIA with the rule of law found that IIA ‘creates at best a weak rule of law 
effect in countries with a poor record of respect for the rule of law’.31 These conclusions 
should prompt us to seriously question the proposition that IIA produces positive rule of law 
effects in host states.  
 
C. The EU's response to the backlash against IIA 
 
There has been an intense backlash against IIA from various actors, including states, civil 
society and scholars. Critiques of the current system vary from arguing for outright 
                                                      
28 Schultz and Dupont (2015). Even in states with more robust rule of law increased use of arbitration might 
hamper the consistent development of the law by courts. The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales has 
argued that the development of the common law by courts in England and Wales was hampered in areas of 
law where arbitration is increasingly used, available at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/lcj-speech-bailli-lecture-20160309.pdf  (last visited 10 February 2018) 
29 Tzouvala, 'The Ordo-Liberals Origins of Modern International Investment Law: Constructing Competition on 
a Global Scale', in A Rasulov and J D Haskell (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law (Springer, 
forthc). 
30 Schneiderman (2010), 937. 
31 T Schultz and C Dupont, ‘Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law of Over-empowering Investors? 
A Quantitative Empirical Study‘ 25(4) European Journal of International Law (2015) 1147, 1163. 
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rejection32 to offering suggestions for remedying its flawed features.33 Critics particularly 
refer to the proceedings' lack of transparency and inclusiveness; the high fees charged by 
arbitrators and legal representatives; the absence of an appeals process; and the 
inconsistency of decisions on issues involving public interest. They also question the 
impartiality of arbitrators by pointing to concerns over general conflicts of interest, elitism, 
and specific vested financial interests in certain outcomes.  At a more substantive level, the 
way IIA serves to advance neoliberal policies around the globe, in particular imposing such 
policies on developing states, has been denounced.34 
 
The potentially detrimental effect of IIA on democratic governance merits particular 
consideration. It has been convincingly argued that broad and inconsistent interpretations 
by IIA tribunals of the substantive rights afforded to investors under the IIL regime have a 
shrinking effect on the policy space of elected governments.35 Indeed, host states have not 
always been successful in defending their actions even when explaining they had to 
interfere with investments in order to fulfil their human rights obligations under 
international law and domestic constitutions.36 Particular features of IIA also prompt 
suspicions of a built-in bias in favour of investors, for example the facts that the process can 
only be initiated by investors under BITs and that investors are endowed with substantive 
rights but without incurring reciprocal obligations.  
 
Solutions offered to rectify these defects have included: enhancing transparency of 
proceedings and arbitral decisions; increasing third party participation in the procedure via 
                                                      
32 D Schneiderman (2010); OHCHR, Investor-State dispute settlement undermines rule of law and democracy, 
UN expert tells Council of Europe, 19 April 2016, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19839&LangID=E (last visited 10 
February 2018). 
33 See for instance, G Van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints: Judicial Restraint in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration (Oxford UP, 2013); S Schill, ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: 
Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach’, 52 Vanderbilt Journal of 
International Law (2011) 57.  
34 M Sornarajah, ‘Toward Normlessness: The Ravage and Retreat of Neo-Liberalism in International Investment 
Law’ 2 Yearbook of International Investment Law and Policy (2010) 595. D Schneiderman, Resisting Economic 
Globalization: Critical Theory and International Investment Law (Palgrave Macmillan 2013). 
35 Schneiderman (2010); Van Harten (2013).  
36 Tecmed v Mexico; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19; Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur 
Partzuergoa v The Argentine Republic, (Award, 8 December 2016) ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26. 
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amicus curiae interventions; setting up an appeals mechanism; introducing codes of conduct 
for arbitrators; and limiting the interpretive radius of substantive protections in treaty 
provisions by listing legitimate policy grounds that can be invoked by host states. Most 
importantly, in September 2015, the EU proposed the creation of an Investment Court 
System, ‘to replace the old ISDS model in all [EU]’s ongoing and future trade negotiations’.37 
This was in response to the negative reactions from around Europe against the initial plans 
to incorporate IIA into TTIP. The proposal immediately became the flagship innovation of 
the EU’s infant investment policy. ICS has been incorporated into CETA, and it is also now 
found in the EU-Vietnam free trade agreement as the investment tribunal system.38 The 
EU’s Trade Commissioner has presented the proposal as revolutionary, claiming it  expresses 
the EU’s aspiration to lead the way globally in reforming the current IIA model.39  
  
The ICS proposal offers a reformed version of the current IIA system, attempting to address 
the concerns raised. In the words of the CETA negotiators, the proposed rules aim to 
institutionalise a fairer and more transparent version of IIA.40 The key innovation of the ICS 
is the establishment of a permanent arbitration mechanism consisting of a first instance 
tribunal and an appeals tribunal operating under full transparency.41 With this, the EU aims 
to achieve consistency and transparency in decision-making; overcome the ethical 
challenges to arbitrator appointments and conduct;42 and increase third party participation 
in the proceedings.43 Other notable provisions of the proposal include sections on 
interpretation,44 on restricting parallel claims and claims by investors who acquired the 
                                                      
37 C Malmström, Proposing an Investment Court System, 16 September 2015, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/proposing-investment-court-system_en (last 
visited 10 February 2018). 
38 Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Chapter II Article 
12. 
39 Malmström (2015). 
40 Joint statement by C Malmström and C Freeland on Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA), 29 February 2016, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-16-
446_en.htm  (last visited 10 February 2018). 
41 See Articles 9, 10 and 18 of the ICS proposal text for TTIP, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/september/tradoc_153807.pdf (last visited 10 February 2018). 
42 Ibid, Article 11. 
43 Ibid Articles 22 and 23. 
44 Ibid Article 13(5). 
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investment for purposes of submitting a dispute against the host state,45 and on limiting 
mass claims by an unidentified number of claimants.46 
 
To justify the adoption of ICS, the Commission refers to the potential lack of impartiality of 
domestic courts in claims against host states, state immunity from suit, unavailability of 
certain remedies in domestic courts, and—most unconvincingly—to ‘different applicable 
rules which cannot be invoked before domestic courts'.47 The document does not clarify 
what exactly the obstacle would be for domestic courts to apply international treaty 
protections to cases before them, where these rules govern the substance of the dispute.48 
There is ample evidence showing application of a wide variety of international law norms by 
domestic courts ranging from treaties on human rights to environmental protection.49  
 
The Commission’s proposal received mixed reactions from critical commentators. These can 
be divided into four main groups. The first group consists of those objecting to the adoption 
of international dispute settlement for investment disputes between liberal constitutional 
democracies on grounds that the negotiating parties have some of the most developed legal 
systems.50 For this group, IIA or ICS only makes sense for agreements with countries that do 
not provide adequate domestic legal protection. Weiler has labelled this double standard 
approach ‘European hypocrisy’ (in comments that predate the Commission’s ICS proposal).51 
In an approach representative of the second group, he wants to see IIA's most egregious 
defects corrected so that the system can then be transformed into a more permanent 
mechanism for all international investment disputes. At the same time there is recognition 
                                                      
45 Ibid Articles 14 and 15. 
46 Ibid Article 6(5) 
47 Public consultation on modalities for investment protection and ISDS in TTIP, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152280.pdf (last visited 10 February 2018). 
48 The direct applicability of such rules will depend on the constitutional tradition of each contracting state. 
Even in states that follow a dualist model, treaty protections can be transposed into the domestic legal order 
via legislation.  
49 D Shelton, ‘Normative Evolution in Corporate Liability for Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ 
15 Austrian Review of International and European Law (2010) 45, 48-51 
50 See eg E U Petersmann ‘Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements without Rights and Remedies 
of Citisens?’ 18 Journal of International Economic Law (2015) 579, 600; M Kumm, An Empire of Capital? 
Transatlantic Investment Protection as the Institutionalisation of Unjustified Privilege, 25 May 2015, 4(3) ESIL 
Reflections  
51  J Weiler, European Hypocrisy: TTIP and ISDS, 21 January 2015, EJIL:Talk!  available at 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/european-hypocrisy-ttip-and-isds/ (last visited 10 February 2018). 
 
 
12 
 
that there is still some way to go to achieve a good model of ISDS.52 The third group of 
reactions views the proposal as making only very limited improvements to IIA, and ICS 
‘mainly a re-branding exercise for ISDS’.53 This group calls for the creation of a more robust 
international court the jurisdiction of which would be conditioned on the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies.54 For the final group, whatever improvements the ICS proposal brings to 
the existing model, foreign investors will still be unjustifiably advantaged compared both to 
national businesses and the rest of members of a society. These critics argue that ICS should 
be abandoned, as does this essay.55   
 
D. Why the justice bubble should not be reinforced 
 
What justifies treating privileged investors as a category of claimants who should be 
insulated from the access to justice mechanisms which exist at local, including national, 
level? Why should they be entitled to a purportedly more robust method of dispute 
settlement than any other member of society? I argue there is no good reason for this. The 
special treatment international investment disputes receives is unwarranted and, for the EU 
to reinforce it, is a move in the wrong direction. The second reason why this move should be 
resisted is that it creates an even more solid justice bubble and it is in the very nature of 
justice bubbles to undermine development.  
                                                      
52 See e.g. C Titi, ‘The European Union’s Proposal for an International Investment Court: Significance, 
Innovations and Challenges Ahead’, Transnational Dispute Management (2017) 1; R Quick, ‘Why TTIP Should 
Have an Investment Chapter Including ISDS’, 49(2) Journal of World Trade (2015), 199; R Howse, ‘Counting the 
Critics of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: the EU proposal for a judicial system for investment disputes’ 
available at https://cdn-media.web-view.net/i/fjj3t288ah/Courting_the_Criticsdraft1.pdf (last visited 10 
February 2018); B Choudry, 2015: The Year of Reorienting International Investment Law’, ASIL Insights, 
available at https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/3/2015-year-reorienting-international-investment-
law (last visited 10 February 2018); Schill, ASIL Insight 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/9/european-commissions-proposal-investment-court-system-
ttip-stepping (last visited 10 February 2018). 
53 G Van Harten, ‘Key Flaws in the European Commission’s Proposals for Foreign Investor Protection in TTIP’, 
12 Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No.16 (2016). 
54 See for instance, G Van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints: Judicial Restraint in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration (Oxford UP, 2013); S Schill, ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: 
Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach’, 52 Vanderbilt Journal of 
International Law (2011) 57.  
55 D Schneiderman (2010); OHCHR, Investor-State dispute settlement undermines rule of law and democracy, 
UN expert tells Council of Europe, 19 April 2016, available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19839&LangID=E  (last visited 10 
February 2018). 
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As said previously, there are thousands of investment treaties which contain substantive 
and procedural provisions that constitute an unprecedented international legal protection 
regime. This regime is designed to maximise investor protection and to minimise direct and 
indirect government interference with the returns on the investment. For investors, its 
obvious advantage is that it gives them the possibility of having their disputes with host 
states regarding their investment settled via mandatory international arbitration. IIA 
tribunals are often formed of highly qualified specialists. Problematically, their mandate is 
limited to applying the relevant investment treaty and, typically, the latter stipulates the 
rights of investors at a high level of abstraction. Inevitably, the succint and abstract 
formulation of substantive protections, coupled with the absence of a rule of binding 
precedent and the lack of an appeals mechanism, gives IIA tribunals considerable 
interpretative discretion.  
 
Approaching the investor-state relationship and the disputes from a privity lens, one 
observes that IIL tends to take a narrow view of the nature and impact of the dispute. 
However, the way a dispute—concerning, for example, a water concession or the 
construction of a pipeline—is resolved can have serious effects beyond the immediate 
parties to the dispute, the more so since an IIA tribunal might hesitate to take public 
impacts into consideration given its mandate is limited by the investment treaty to deal only 
with investment interests.56 Since the objective of investment treaties is to promote and 
protect investments, tribunals generally interpret the abstract rules in a manner compatible 
with those objectives.  
 
The Yukos dispute, which involved a series of claims against Russia by Yukos investors 
seeking compensation for the violation of their property and due process rights, can serve 
to illustrate the extent of the protections under the current IIA model. One set of 
proceedings took place before  the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),57 a second set 
                                                      
56 W M Reisman, ‘Case Specific Mandates’ versus ‘Systemic Implications’: How Should Investment Tribunals 
Decide? The Freshfields Arbitration Lecture, 29(2) Arbitration International (2013) 131. 
57 Case of Oao Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia (Application no. 14902/04). 
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before an IIA tribunal. The  ECtHR ordered Russia to pay the claimants €1.87 billion in just 
satisfaction under the European Convention on Human Rights. This was the largest 
compensation this court had ever awarded. Still, it was dwarfed by the $50billion awarded 
by the IIA tribunal for essentially the same dispute under the Energy Charter Treaty.58  
 
From the perspective of investors, the only obvious disadvantage of IIA as opposed to using 
domestic courts is the costs of using this procedure. In the Yukos case, the costs awarded to 
the claimant in the IIA proceedings reached up to $60 million, while the ECtHR awarded 
€300,000 in costs—again an unprecedented amount for the ECtHR. Nonetheless, the high 
costs of using and maintaining IIA actually adds to its privileged nature since they limit its 
use to the few privileged investors who can afford it.  
 
What makes the IIA system a justice bubble is not whether the outcomes of these cases 
tend to favour investors.59 Rather, the problem is that the cards are stacked in favour of the 
investors by design. In other words, a special forum is made de facto available only to 
wealthier investors to secure investment interests beyond the fora and remedies available 
to the other members of society in domestic legal systems.    
 
If the underlying assumption is that investor-state disputes are most effectively settled 
internationally, then the ICS proposal can appear to be a genuine attempt to respond to 
some of the weakenesses identified by the backlash against IIA. If, however, domestic 
judiciaries respecting the rule of law are the gold standard for access to justice, why is the 
EU pushing for the ICS? If IIA or ICS are solutions to a genuine concern about defects in 
                                                      
58 Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 227; Later, the 
IIA award was set aside by domestic courts at the seat of arbitration (The Hague), on grounds that the IIA 
tribunal did not have jurisdiction. An English translation of the judgment available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7258.pdf (last visited 10 February 2018). 
The Yukos claimants may still be able to enforce the IIA award, despite The Hague court’s decision; See 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/05/13/the-us50-billion-yukos-award-overturned-enforcement-
becomes-a-game-of-russian-roulette/ (last visited 10 February 2018 ). 
59 The data available on outcomes has been interpreted in different ways by scholars; See for instance T 
Schultz and C Dupont (2015),15-16-17; S Franck, ‘Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration’, 50 Harvard International Law Journal (2009) 435; G Van Harten, ‘The Use of Quantitative Methods 
to Examine Possible Bias in Investment Arbitration, Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 2010-
2011 (Oxford UP 2010). 
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domestic access to justice and rule of law, one would wish the EU to remedy the 
shortcomings in the local remedy systems. Especially given that the EU sees itself as a 
standard-setter which can positively influence the rest of the world,60 it should work at 
minimising the use of an international dispute settlement mechanism—not institutionalising 
a justice bubble for the few.  
 
The premise of the argument for transferring settlement of investor-state disputes to 
international tribunals or courts is that international dispute settlement promises more 
effective legal protection for foreign investors. It is claimed that foreign investors could be 
at a disadvantage if they have to challenge host state acts in host state courts due to 
possible bias and discrimination against them on the basis of their nationality.61 In response 
to this alleged problem, policy-makers have taken the necessary steps to secure due process 
rights of investors as a matter of priority, in order to help investment flow without undue 
burden. However, even if  it could be assumed that domestic courts and judges are indeed 
biased against foreign investors, the observation has to be made that investors do not form 
the only group against which domestic courts might carry biases. So, the question arises, 
what makes IIL disputes more important than other kinds of disputes, such that the creation 
of such a special and powerful dispute settlement mechanism is warranted for them alone? 
Would all disputes not deserve to be settled by impartial and efficient courts?  
 
The adoption of the ICS model in CETA or TTIP leads one to ask whether the EU, its member 
states, Canada and the US fail to grant effective judicial protection to investors. The 
standard answer is no. In the EU, access to effective judicial protection is guaranteed for 
everyone, regardless of the nationality of the parties, in member state constitutions, under 
the ECHR, and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In the US and Canada due process 
rights are guaranteed by the respective constitutions of those countries. In all three 
jurisdictions, the abstract rights guaranteed in these core documents are brought to life by 
relatively strong national judiciaries. In the EU, a further level of protection is provided at 
                                                      
60 The EU sees itself as a global leader in this field, viewing TTIP and CETA as potentially becoming the ‘golden 
standard’ of investment treaty-making, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/malmstrom/blog/proposing-investment-court-system_en (last visited 10 February 2018) 
61 Francioni (2009). 
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the regional level also through the ECtHR and the CJEU. The right to a fair trial and access to 
remedy are among the few human rights granted to corporations, including corporate 
investors, on a par with individuals (as the Yukos case illustrates). Given this, attempts to 
justify the inclusion of IIA or ICS for these mega-regional agreements by reference to access 
to justice and rule of law arguments ring hollow. This observation is not meant to repeat 
Weiler's ‘European hypocrisy’ argument against IIA. Rather, what I wish to stress is the 
double standard promoted by policy-makers who prioritise safeguarding investor interests, 
while neglecting the effects of potential domestic rule of law flaws on the rest of the 
society, particularly the most disadvantaged groups.  
 
Concerns about access to effective remedies in developed jurisdictions are not unjustified. 
There is, however, no evidence to suggest that European states, the US or Canada fail to 
provide effective remedies to investors. Rather, flaws in access to justice primarily affect 
members of low-income and vulnerable groups in these jurisdictions,62 and these ‘groups 
most in need of legal assistance have the least access to political leverage that could secure 
it’.63 Proponents of IIA often consider foreign investors vulnerable because they do not have 
the right to vote to elect representatives who will determine the policies affecting their 
investment.64 Yet the type of investor likely to use the IIA or ICS mechanisms has far more 
political leverage to secure its interests within the domestic legal system than many other 
portions of the society, particularly the poorest and most vulnerable.65 It is, at best, 
questionable to reduce democratic representation and political leverage to the act of voting 
and then to conclude that the ability to vote guarantees that the laws enacted by the 
legislature will equally guard the interests of all voters. Moreover, not having the ability to 
vote does not mean that one’s interests will not be protected by legislation. Legal persons 
such as companies cannot participate in the democratic process through voting, but they 
can have very strong influence, via lobbying, to promote legislation that safeguards their 
                                                      
62 The term ‘vulnerable groups’ are used to include, but not limited to, indigenous peoples, minority groups, 
single parents, homeless people, children, migrants and refugees, disabled. 
63 D L Rhode, Access to Justice (Oxford UP 2004), 3. 
64 Tecmed v Mexico; C Schreuer, ‘Do We Need Investment Arbitration?’, in J E Kalicki and A Joubin-Bret (eds) 
reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century (Brill Nijhoff 2015). 
65 Schneiderman (2013), 131. 
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interests.66 At domestic and international governance levels, large corporate actors and 
business interests get their agenda pushed forward much more forcefully than civil 
society.67   
 
There is no evidence to show that foreign investors are more vulnerable to negative bias in 
domestic courts than any other group. Even relative to the treatment of domestic investors, 
foreign investors are not necessarily more vulnerable to political risk than their domestic 
counterparts.68 Indeed, they might receive better treatment before local courts than 
domestic investors.69 In addition, regardless of whether a corporation would commonly be 
classifed as domestic, with sufficient resources it will easily side-step national law by careful 
corporate planning which allows them to pose as 'foreign', thus benefiting from favourable 
investment treaty provisions that national courts are bound to uphold.70    
 
Wealthy investors are more likely to possess the expertise and resources to safeguard their 
rights, even in times of political crises that may adversely affect their investment. This is not 
to say that they will not suffer from time to time from the whims of capricious governments 
but they remain better placed and equipped to both enforce and defend their rights. Flaws 
in access to justice are a much more acute problem for the weakest segments of society. 
The UN Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor has estimated that ‘at least 
four billion people are excluded from the rule of law’.71 In its work the UN Commission 
documented the systemic inequalities for access to justice for the poor and vulnerable.72 
Even in the most developed countries, access to courts and legal representation remains a 
                                                      
66 E Aisbett and C McAusland, ‘Firm Characteristics and Influence on Government Rule-Making: Theory and 
Evidence’ 29 European Journal of Political Economy (2013) 214, D Schneiderman (2013), 937. 
67 Chimni  (2006), 13; E Aisbett and L Poulsen, ‘Relative Treatment of Aliens: Firm-level Evidence from 
Developing Countries’ GEG Working Paper 122, December 2016, 5. 
68 Aisbett and Poulsen (2016). 
69 Ibid. 
70 For example Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation and Libananco Holdings Co. 
Limited v. Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8) both saw the applicants arguing that they were foreign 
investors because they had used corporate entities incorporated in off-shore jurisdictions to roundtrip their 
investments. 
71 UN Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, Making the Law Work for Everyone Volume I, (2008)3; 
Report of the Secretary-General to the UNGA on Legal Empowerment of the poor and eradication of poverty 
(2009) A/64/133. 
72 UN Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, Making the Law Work for Everyone Volume II Working 
Group Reports (2008). 
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challenge for low income and vulnerable individuals due to lack of financial resources, 
inaccessibility of the law, excessive formalism, geographical distance, and lack of faith in the 
judiciary.73 Increasingly limited access to legal aid only serves to excacerbate this 
challenge.74  
 
The inequalities prevalent in all societies disproportionately affect access to justice for the 
poor and vulnerable, making them suffer more than any other group from flaws in access to 
justice.75 In short, the evidence shows that the weakest segments of the society are in 
greater need of legal empowerment than international investors. It follows that policy-
makers concerned with legal empowerment should prioritise the needs of the former group 
not the latter. At the very least, within the EU and its investment treaty partner states, 
resources that would be allocated to the creation and maintainance of the ICS could instead 
be allocated to the legal needs of those who need such assistance the most. 
 
A slightly different but equally powerful argument against the entrenchment of a justice 
bubble for privileged investors as proposed by the EU is that it is likely to have a 
fragmenting effect on local legal development76 and thus on the development process as a 
whole. Granted, investment can play an important role in development. However, whether 
the special fora for resolving investor-state disputes can make any contribution towards 
development goals is open to question for at least three reasons. Firstly, outsourcing IIL 
disputes to international tribunals without the pre-requisite of exhausting local remedies 
could be expected to have a chilling effect on the development of local capacity and 
expertise in important areas of law.77 Secondly, there is the excessive cost of international 
ISDS; the hugely expensive process cannot but be absorbing funds from the public purse 
                                                      
73 J T Johnsen, Vulnerable Groups at the Legal Services Market, in Access to Justice and the Judiciary: Towards 
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74 Johnsen (2009), 33. 
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that many would prefer to see allocated to improving local means for access to justice or to 
the progressive realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. Thirdly, IAA or ICS is likely 
to exacerbate inequality. Special paths of investor protection make the privileged even 
more privileged, thus widening the pre-existing gap that exist in domestic legal systems.   
 
The former Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights has urged states to 
include the elimination of inequality in access to justice within their post-2015 development 
goals, viewing it as ‘a vital feature of human-centred social and economic development.’ 78 
Public resources and the attention of policy-makers should not be dedicated to maintaining 
expensive paths to justice for a privileged few but to remedying the flaws and inequalities 
that exist at the local level. Sen has demonstrated that legal development is an integral part 
of the process of development, contributing to economically, politically and socially.79 
Improving local access to justice, even from a utilitarian point of view, would have broader 
positive effects on the investment climate beyond legal protection, including the political, 
economic and social climate in the host states. Investor-state disputes are only one of the 
many types of disputes that an investor would have whilst operating in the host state. A 
well-functioning local legal system would benefit the investor in all its relationships with 
other parties, including other businesses and its employees. 
 
Improving the local rule of law as a constituent element of, and a catalyst for, development 
has been on the agenda of inter-governmental organisations, national development 
agencies, and development banks for decades, particularly for developing countries and 
countries in transition. The intention, though, is not to re-state the obvious. The message 
here is that, regardless of the development level of a country, improving access to justice for 
all segments of the society would lead to more meaningful development outcomes than 
providing special justice paths to a privileged few.  
 
 
                                                      
78 M Sepúlveda, ‘Equality and access to justice in the post-2015 development agenda’, 2013, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Poverty/LivingPoverty/AccessJusticePost2015.pdf  (last visited 10 
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E. Conclusion 
 
The EU’s insistence on including an adapted form of IIA in its investment relationships with 
the US and Canada, despite lack of evidence to suggest that any of these countries fail to 
grant effective legal protection to investors, shows that the prioritisation of interests is not 
necessarily between developing and developed states, but rather—in all states—a division 
between the economically powerful and the disadvantaged. Within both developing and 
developed states, the interests of powerful business interests, local or foreign, take priority 
and are granted ‘the highest possible protection’.80 While IIA may empower investors from 
developed countries to challenge certain developing state policies, in the same way they 
empower investors to challenge the policies of developed states that go against their 
agenda.  
 
In this essay, I have demonstrated that within states at all levels of development, investors 
might suffer from a weak rule of law, but that disadvantaged groups are much more 
seriously and disproportionately affected by such flaws. While investors may suffer from 
arbitrary government interference with their investments, they are better placed to fight 
back than the disadvantaged. Outsourcing resolution of investment disputes to specialised 
tribunals outside the domestic systems creates a justice bubble for powerful actors who 
already have significant capacity to effect change in host states. The goal here is not to 
advocate a complete rejection of arbitration for resolving investment disputes. As with all 
other types of voluntary alternative dispute settlement, investment arbitration should be 
available if the parties agree to submit disputes to arbitration in their investment contract. 
However, having IIA as the default and permanent setting is objectionable. The EU’s ICS 
proposal takes the ad hoc justice bubbles created by a large web of investment treaties one 
step further by attempting to make ISDS outsourcing permanent. It is a short-sighted plan 
that is likely to have detrimental effects on access to justice for all.  
 
                                                      
80 D Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and Democracy’s Promise, 
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